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A Primer on China’s Bribery Regulation: Status Quo,
Development, Drawback, and Proposed Solution
Fanyu Zeng

Abstract
Today, the People's Republic of China (hereinafter China) has
become one of the largest economic entities in the world. With the
development of China, the problem of bribery has imposed more negative
impacts on China’s government and market. This paper is on China’s
current regulations on bribery.
This paper is divided into six parts: (1) Introduction to China’s legal
regulation on bribery; (2) Who can be bribed in China? (3) What
constitutes bribery under China laws? (4) Defenses against bribery
charges;

(5)

Punishment

and

Liability

(Criminal

Punishment,

Administrative Punishment, and Private Action); and (6) Drawbacks and
Proposals for China’s anti-bribery laws.
I use a comparative-study methodology in this paper to compare
China’s anti-bribery laws with International anti-bribery conventions (like
United Nations Convention Against Corruption and other countries
similar laws (like Foreign Corruption Practice Act, UK Anti-Bribery Act
2010, California Unfair Competition Law, etc.). Based the comparison, I
identify China’s anti-bribery laws’ disadvantages in legal system and
legal practice, and provide constructive advices.
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Part 1: Introduction to China’s Legal Regulations on Bribery
Since 1978, China has been adopting the “Open and Reform Policy”.
Under the policy, China has begun to rebuild its legal system destroyed
by the Great Cultural Revolution. With the significant economic
development based on the “Open and Reform Policy,” China is suffering
the same problem as most economic high-growth countries: bribery.
China is a socialist country led by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”),
and there are many state-owned or controlled enterprises lacking effective
supervision. A private person or a private company who wants to make a
transaction with the state owned or controlled companies is very likely to
bribe them. With the development of the globalization trend, more and
more international companies have entered China. They have a strong
incentive to open the market by illegal means, like bribing China’s state
officials. To cope with the above corruption problems, China paid more
attention to make laws regulating bribery. In detail, regarding China’s
domestic anti-bribery regulations, China has established criminal
punishment and administrative punishment against bribery violations in
its Criminal Law and Anti-Unfair Competition Law, respectively.
Furthermore, a private party is entitled to bring a civil lawsuit against a
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briber when the briber makes him suffer damages. Regarding China’s
participation in international anti-bribery legal practice, China has
become a member state of the United Nations Convention against
Corruption (hereinafter UNCAC), and joined the working group of
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (hereafter OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention). Although China has far to go in becoming a transparent
country, it has made some achievements in anti-bribery practice.

Part 2: Who can be bribed in China?
On a private party’s perspective, the burning question for them is to
know who can he or she bribe in China? When you give a red packet (gift
of money) to a Chinese friend, does it constitute a bribe? It depends on
who receives a red packet and why you give the red packet to him or her.
Thus, the first thing we need to know is who can become a target of a
briber?
Ⅰ. Bribing a China State Functionary
Unlike in the United States, China does not adopt “public official” in
the crime of bribing a person. Instead, China uses the term “state
functionary” to describe the person performing public power. When a
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common person, especially a foreign person, first sees this term, he or she
is very likely to feel confused: what is a state functionary? Is there any
difference between the concept of government official and that of state
functionary?
1. What is a state functionary under China law?
It is a common sense that to bribe a person exercising public power is
illegal. Nevertheless, the question becomes a bit complex because there is
a difference between “state functionaries” and “persons who perform
public service in state organs.” Unlike the United States or the United
Kingdom, China does not make a very clear line between government
official and a non-government person. Under Article 93 of China’s
Criminal Law, the concept of state functionaries is broader than the
concept of “persons who perform public service in state organs.” The
former concept also includes “persons who perform public service in
state-owned

companies

or

enterprises,

institutions

or

people's

organizations, persons who are assigned by State organs, State-owned
companies, enterprises or institutions to companies, enterprises or
institutions that are not owned by the State or people's organizations to
perform public service and the other persons who perform public service
according to law shall all be regarded as State functionaries.” The
relationship between the two concepts are showed by the following
figure:
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China is a socialist country. The public power is distributed to
different organizations and people even though they are not working in
the government, if we use a narrow perspective to define the concept of a
government. We use China’s village-committee system as an example.
Under China’s administrative law, a village cannot constitute a local
government. A town is the basic-level government in China. A village is
managed by its village committee. And the directors of the village are
elected by the village’s residents. Thus, theoretically we cannot say that
the directors of the village committee are employed by the government of
China or working for the China’s government. Nevertheless, under
China’s judicial interpretation, a director of the village committee can
become a target of a briber.1 For example, in a village of Fanyu City,
Guangzhou Province, all the residents of this village received about $40
million as compensation for their taken property. Five directors of the
1

Article 12 of The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of
Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of the Law in the Handling of Criminal Bribery (See
https://www.cov.com/files/upload/Carlson_SPP_SPC_Judicial_Interpretation_on_Bribery_Enforcement.pdf)
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village committee were responsible for keeping the huge amount of
money. A bank officer gave $250,000 to the five officers and asked them
to invest about $6 million in their finance management products as
compensation. Ultimately, the five officers were convicted of receiving
briberies as public functionaries. The reason why village committee
officers can be deemed as state functionaries in particular circumstances
is that the village committee is on behalf of the government to regulate
the local society. Thus, it is reasonable that the Criminal Code regard the
village committee officers as state functionaries when they are stand for
the government to manage the gross-root society. 2
The reasons that China’s criminal law created two related and
different concepts (State Functionary and Persons who perform public
service in state organs):
a)

Economic Reason

China has many state-owned or controlled enterprises because it is
a socialist country. Under China’s constitution, these public assets belong
to the whole Chinese people. 3 The directors of these state-owned
enterprises are on behalf of whole Chinese people to keep and manage
these public assets. Thus, it is reasonable to deem these state-owned or
controlled enterprises as managers. It is also necessary to regulate and

2

Article 111 of Constitution the People’s Republic of China (See
http://www.cpd.com.cn/gb/flfg/2003-04/11/content_1821.htm)
3
Article 7 of Constitution the People’s Republic of China (See
http://www.cpd.com.cn/gb/flfg/2003-04/11/content_1821.htm)
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discipline bribery violations in the transaction when one side is a
state-owned enterprise. In practice, China’s state owned-enterprises are
high-risk areas of bribery violations. For example, the former chairman of
PetroChina Company Limited, Jiang Jiemin, was convinced of crime of
receiving briberies, abusing power, and holding a huge amount of
property with unidentified sources; The court determined that the
briberies received by Jiang were worth more than $2 million not
including the huge amount of property with unidentified sources. 4
b)

Political Reason

The village committees are not deemed as an independent
administrative level in China. The leader of a village committee is
directly elected by the local residents. Nevertheless, these village
committees receive lots of subsidiaries from the central government and
the local governments. These village committees distribute the
subsidiaries to the rural residents and assist the government in managing
the rural society. Thus, under the interpretation of Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress (a legislative interpretation that has the
same effect as the enacted statutes), in particular circumstances, an officer
of village committees can be regarded as a state functionary.
2. Foreign Countries’ and International Organization’s Legal
Practice of the Term “Foreign Public Official”

4

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiang_Jiemin
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1) United States
A. FCPA
The FCPA does not adopt the term “state functionary”. Instead, the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provision apply to corrupt payments to: (1) “any
foreign political official;” (2) “any foreign political party or official
thereof;” (3) “any candidate of foreign for foreign political office;” or (4)
any person, while knowing that all or a portion of the payment will be
offered, given, or promised to an individual falling within of these three
categories.5
The FCPA defines “foreign official” as including: any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such
government or department, agency or in instrumentality or for or on
behalf of any such public international organizations. 6
Foreign officials under the FCPA include officers or employee of a
department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government. When a
foreign government is organized in a fashion similar to the U.S. system,
what constitutes a government department or agency is typically clear
(e.g., a ministry of energy, national security agency, or transportation
authority). For example, the United States has state-owned entities, like
5
6

Section 30A(a)(1)-(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)-(3); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)-(3),
78dd(a)(1)-(3).
Section 30A(f)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A); 15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(h)(2)(A); 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
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the Tennessee Valley Authority, that are instrumentalities of the
government. 7
However, governments are organized in very different ways, like
China.8 In a differently-structured foreign government, many briberies
happen through state-owned and state-controlled entities, particularly in
such areas as aerospace and defense manufacturing, banking and finance,
healthcare and life sciences, energy and extractive industries,
telecommunications, and transportation. 9
For example, Petroleos Mexicanos ("Pemex") was a national oil
company wholly owned by the government of the Republic of Mexico,
and was an instrumentality of the Mexican government. Crawford
Enterprises, Inc. ("CEI") was a corporation organized under the laws of
Texas with its principal offices in Houston, Texas. CEI was in the
business of selling compression equipment systems to Pemex for use in
the exploration, production and transmission of Mexican oil and natural
gas. Similarly, Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. ("Ruston") and C.E. Miller
Corporation ("Cemco") was a corporation engaged in the development,
production, and sale of turbine compression equipment for use in the
petroleum industry. In order to obtain purchase orders for turbine
compression systems and related equipment, CEI, along with Cemco,

7

McCarthy v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 466 F. 3d 399, 411 n. 18.
See generally, World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership,
World Bank Policy Research Report at 78 (1995); Sunita Kikeri and Aishetu Kolo,
9
Id. at 1.
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Solar and Ruston, engaged in a conspiracy to pay Pemex officials bribes
equal to approximately 4.5% to 5% of each Pemex purchase order for
compression equipment systems in which CEI participated. On
September 17, 1982, the US Department of Justice filed a criminal
complaint against Cemco and the president, chairman of the board, and
majority shareholder of Cemco, charging them with aiding and abetting
under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.

10

Accordingly a

state-owned company was deemed as a department, agency, or
instrumentality of a foreign government. A foreign state-owned company
is within the scope of the concept to the “foreign officials.” To bribe a
foreign state-owned company’s official may trigger the FCPA’s
anti-bribery provision.
B. Domestic Bribery Statute
The U.S. has a domestic bribery statute to regulate domestic
bribery of public officials.11 Under 18 U.S.C. 201, the domestic bribery
statute uses the phrase “public official” to describe the person performing
government power. This concept not only includes the officials or
employees of the government, but also covers “any official function,
under or by authority”.

12

Accordingly, to be a public official under the

context of the United States law is not required to work in a particular
department oragency.
10
11
12

United States of America v. C.E. Miller Corporation, et al., No. 82-cr-788 (C.D. Cal. Sept.17, 1982)
18 U.S.C. 201
Id.
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According to the FCPA and the domestic bribery statute, both the
phrase “foreign official” and the phrase “public official” are broad
concepts. Both of them hold an open attitude to include all the people
exercising public power under the authority of the government into the
scope of “public or foreign official”.
2) United Kingdom
The Bribery Act 2010 is the main act regulating bribery for the United
Kingdom. Under Section 6 of the Bribery Act 2010, like the FCPA, the
Bribery Act 2010 adopts the term “foreign public officials”.
“Foreign public official” means an individual who—
(a)holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind,
whether appointed or elected, of a country or territory outside the United
Kingdom (or any subdivision of such a country or territory),
(b)exercises a public function
(i)for or on behalf of a country or territory outside the United
Kingdom (or any subdivision of such a country or territory), or
(ii)for any public agency or public enterprise of that country or
territory (or subdivision), or
(c)is an official or agent of a public international organization. 13
We find that both UK Bribery Act 2010 and the FCPA define the
“public official” in a broad context, which includes officers or employee

13

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/6
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of a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government.
3) UNCAC
Under Article 2 of UNCAC, the term “ public official” shall mean: (i)
any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial
office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent
or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person’s
seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including
for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as
defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the
pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a
“public official” in the domestic law of a State Party. However, for the
purpose of some specific measures contained in Chapter II of this
Convention, “public official” may mean any person who performs a
public function or provides a public service as defined in the domestic
law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that
State Party.”
Additionally, the term “foreign public official” means any person
holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; and any person exercising
a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or
public enterprise.14

14

Article 2 of UNCAC (See
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On one hand, UNCAC tries to define the term “public official” based
on where they work. If the person is “holding a legislative, executive,
administrative or judicial office of a State Party,” he or she will be a
“public official”. On the other hand, UNCAC does not ignore that the
people “who perform a public function or provides a public service” or
“exercise a public function” can constitute a “(foreign) public official
even though he or she is not working in the “legislative, executive,
administrative, or judicial office”.

15

Thus, under UNCAC, whether a

person is working in a legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial
office is not a required element to be a (foreign) public official.
Conversely, being a (foreign) public official requires authorization to
perform or exercise a public function, or provide a public service.
3. A

Comparative

Perspective

among

Foreign

Countries,

International Public Organization, and China in how to Define
People who Perform a Public Function or Provide a Public
Service.
1) Difference
The United Kingdom, the United States, the UNCAC, and China
used different phrases to describe the people using public power and
performing a public service. Foreign countries and international public
organizations prefer to use the term “Public Official.” Instead, China

15

https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf
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prefers to use term “State Functionary.”
2) Similarity
In a literal analysis, although they use different phrases to describe
the people using public power and performing public service, we can find
the literal similarity between the two phrases. Under the Black Law
Dictionary, the phrase “official” is defined as “… a person elected or
appointed to carry out some portion of a government’s sovereign
powers.”16 The Black Law Dictionary defines the phrase “state” as “an
institution of self-government within a large political entity.” 17 Further,
the phrase “functionary” is defined as “someone who fills a specific role
in a political party or some other organization. We tend to picture them as
people in gray suits who follow the boss's orders and don't think for
themselves.” 18 Comparing the two terms, we find the similarity is that
both are describing people carrying out the sovereign power, performing
public service, and exercising public functions.
In an empirical analysis of China law, the FCPA, the Anti-Bribery
Act 2000, and the UNCAC include any officer or employee excising
public power or function.
4. Conclusion
Although China has more complicated regulation in some particular
circumstances, like the directors of the village committee, which results
16
17
18

Black Law Dictionary, Forth Pocket Edition (2011)
Id.
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/functionary
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in China use different phrases to describe the people performing public
service. Nonetheless, by the above comparison, the term “state
functionary” and “public official” have basically a similar meaning: all
of them are describing people exercising public power or function.
Accordingly, we can say the term “state functionary” basically amounts
to “public official” in most circumstances.
Ⅱ. Bribing a China Public Sector
1. Introduction
Under China’s Criminal Code, it is illegal to bribe a public sector with
a specific intent to pursuing an illegal interest.19
2. What is a Public Sector?
The Black Law Dictionary defines “public sector” as “the part of
the economy or an industry that is controlled by the government.”20
China is a socialist country and has more varieties in public sectors: state
organ, state-owned company, enterprise, institution and people's
organization. 21

3. What is the Difference between Bribing a State Functionary and
a Public Sector?
19

Article 391 of China’s Criminal Code (See
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf111042.shtml)
20
Black Law Dictionary, Forth Pocket Edition (2011)
21
Article 391 of China’s Criminal Law (See
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf111042.shtml)
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The main difference is the target. The target of bribing a state
functionary must be a natural person. A legal person cannot be a target in
a crime of bribing a state functionary. Conversely, the target of bribing a
public sector are state organ, state-owned company, enterprise, institution
and people's organization. Thus, a natural person cannot be the target of
the crime of bribing a public sector. 22

Ⅲ. Bribing a Private Person (Commercial Bribery)
1. Comparing Bribing a Private Person and Bribing a State
Functionary
Comparing with bribing a state functionary, they have many
similarities: both needs a specific intent of corruption; and in a criminal
prosecution, both require the provided value cannot below a minimum
threshold. 23 Nevertheless, they have some differences:
The difference between bribing a private person and bribing a public
functionary is the target of the bribe. Whether the target of bribery is a
public functionary or a private unit or person. Theoretically, this is a very
distinctive and clear.
However, in practice it is a little confusing for a layperson to

22

Article 391 and Article 389 of China’s Criminal Law ((See
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf111042.shtml)
23
Article 389 and Article 164 of China’s Criminal Law (See
http://www.chinalawedu.com/new/23223a23228a2010/20101222shangf111042.shtml)
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distinguish them in a mixed ownership enterprise. The mixed ownership
enterprise refers to an enterprise’s share owned by China’s government
and other private people and or private entities. In a mixed ownership,
you could find there are state functionaries appointed by China’s
government and private officers which are co-existing in the mixed
ownership enterprise. In this scenario, if the briber’s target is an
appointed state functionary, the briber could commit a crime of bribing a
state functionary. And if the bribery provider’s target is private officer, he
orshe could commit a crime of bribing a private person. 24
The difference is important not only because the two situations
constitute different crimes, but because the criminal penalties are
different in the two crimes. Criminal penalties in the crime of bribing a
state functionary is much heavier than that in the crime of bribing a
private unit/person. In the former crime, the heaviest criminal penalty
could carry life imprisonment while the later crime could carry a 10-year
imprisonment. The reason for a huge difference in criminal penalty
between the two crimes is that the crime of bribing a state function is
more harmful because it could erode the public power system.
2. Foreign Countries’ Legal Practice in Commercial Bribery
Unlike China, the United States is a federal country, meaning the
federal government and the state government share the power in making

24

Citation
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legislation. For commercial bribery, the state government has the
authorization to make laws. The California “Commercial Bribery” law is
as an example:
1) Elements
Under Penal Code Section 641.3, the prosecution must each prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, are as follows:
 An employee who with the intent to injure or defraud;
 Solicits, accepts, or agrees to solicit or accept;
 Money or anything else of value that is more than $250;
 From someone who is not the employer;
 And does so without the knowledge or consent of the employer;
and
 And is done so in return for using his/her position for the benefit
of that person.
2) Defenses
Under Penal Code Section 641.3, there are two kinds of defenses in
California against a commercial bribery charge:
First, the defendant can bring a no-corrupt-intent defense. Under
Penal Code Section 641.3, a person cannot be a briber if the value
provider does not provide the value “corruptly.” Under the Black Law
Dictionary, the term “corruptly” means that “[it] indicates a wrongful
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desire for pecuniary gain or other advantages.” 25 For example, a gift or
offer of something, such as tickets to a sporting event or a case of wine,
may have been offered or sent innocently and with no intent to influence
the other person. Also, the employee or recipient of the gift may have
accepted it with no intent to award a contract or do something in return.
So long as there was no conduct or act taken that could be construed as
undermining or damaging the interests of the employer, there is no
criminal act. Second, under the Penal Code Section 641.3, a defendant
can argue that the provided value is less than $250.

3. A Comparative Perspective between China and California in
Commercial Bribery Law.
1) Corrupt Defense
Both China and California have the corrupt defense. Under Article
164 of China’s Criminal Law, “whoever, for the purpose of seeking
illegitimate benefits, gives money or property to any employee of a
company or enterprise… shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment
of not less than three years but not more than 10 years and shall also be
fined.”
If the value provider does not provide the value corruptly, the
provider is not guilty. In other words, if the provider does not intend to

25

Black Law Dictionary, Forth Pocket Edition (2011)

19 / 44

use the value to influence the value recipient, the value cannot be
regarded as a bribe and the provider cannot be deemed a briber. The main
reason of establishing the corrupt defense is that anti-bribery law should
not punish a, innocent value provider, like if the provided value is a gift
for friendship or the value provider is forced to give the value without
intent to influence the transaction.
2) Minimum Value Threshold
Neither China nor California punish a value provider if the value is
significantly small. Under Article 164 of China’s Criminal Law, “whoever,
for the purpose of seeking illegitimate benefits, gives money or property
to any employee of a company or enterprise, if the amount involved is
relatively large, shall be sentenced ….” Accordingly, the precondition for
a criminal penalty is “the amount involved is relatively large.” Likewise,
under the Penal Code Section 641.3, if the provided value is less than
$250, the prosecutor of California cannot prosecute the value provider for
commercial bribery. The main reason why the law does not use a criminal
penalty to punish a small value bribe is that, compared to a relatively
expensive briber, it is hard to prove a small bribe influenced a recipient’s
decision. It is a common sense that a cup of Starbucks coffee is hard to
bribe a party to award you the contract in a transaction.

20 / 44

Ⅳ. Bribing a Foreign Government Official or International Public
Official
1. Introduction
China’s current criminal regulations on corruption and bribery are
based on the 1997 version of China’s Criminal Law. In 1997, China’s
does establish a criminal regulation on a bribery targeting a foreign state
functionary or an international organization official. However, it does not
mean China pays no attention in the bribery foreign public officials or
public international organization officials. In 2003, China revised the
Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China. Under Article 33
of the Foreign Trade Law of China, a bribe is prohibited in a foreign trade
transaction.
In 2005, China joined the UNCAC. Article 16 of UNCAC prohibits
the bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international public
organizations. As a member of UNCAC, China is obligated to adjust its
domestic law to reflect the requirements of UNCAC. Thus, China revised
its criminal law in 2005 and added a new crime to prohibit the bribery of
foreign public officials or international public organization officials. 26
Most elements of this crime are similar with the crime of bribery of
public functionary except the bribery target.
26

Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (See
https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/eighth-amendment-to-the-criminal-law-of-the-peoples-republi
c-of-china)
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2. Why China created the crime of bribery of foreign public
officials or international organization officials:
First, China is has joined the UNCAC and, as a member of UNCAC,
China is has a duty to adjust its domestic anti-corruption laws to the
requirements of UNCAC.
Second, China joined the OECD Working Group of the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention. Under Article 1 of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, “Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public
official…”. Additionally, under Article 10, “Bribery of a foreign public
official shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence under
the laws of the Parties and the extradition treaties between them.” As a
member of the Working Group, China should adjust its domestic law to
reflect the convention.
Third, with the increased development of China, China has become
the one of the world’s two largest economies and more China local
business entities have entered into the international market. Some
businesses have strong incentives to use bribery to open other countries’
markets. For example, Hong Kong’s former Home Affairs Secretary and
22 / 44

the ex-Foreign Minister of Senegal was arrested by the United States for
allegedly leading a multimillion-dollar bribery scheme in Africa on behalf
of a top Chinese energy company. 27 Without the crime of bribery of
foreign public officials or international organization officials, it would be
hard for China’s government to regulate corruption in the foreign markets
between China’s businessman and foreign public officials or international
organization officials.

Part 3: What is a Bribe under China’s Law?
Ⅰ. Introduction to the Definition of Bribery under China’s Law
Context
The definition of “bribe” has been experiencing a dynamic
development process. Under article 389 of China’s Criminal Law, a bribe
is defined as “money or property.” At this stage, bribes are limited to
currency money and property. This definition resulted in a problem of
some people using intangible benefits to bribe. Thus, to fulfill the gap,
China’s Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
holding power to interpret the legal scope of Chinese law, enacted a joint
judicial interpretation. 28 According to the new judicial interpretation, the
27

http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2120784/us-arrests-former-hong-kong-home-secretar
y-patrick-ho
28
Article 12 of The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of
Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of the Law in the Handling of Criminal Bribery (See
https://www.cov.com/files/upload/Carlson_SPP_SPC_Judicial_Interpretation_on_Bribery_Enforcement.pdf)
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definition of bribery expands to property interests, which is defined as the
money-accountable interest, like tokens, free travel, etc. This expansion is
a constructive development because the bribers and recipients have
become cleverer by hiding their bribery. However, this interpretation also
leaves behind a gap of non-property interest, which may not be accounted
for by money. Suppose a male businessman gets a government contract at
the expense of having a sexual relationship with a female government
officer. Under China’s current laws, the government officer may violate
the governmental internal disciplines (which are not laws but nonetheless
bound to all Chinese government officers) but it is hard to say the
businessman has committed a bribery crime under Chinese current laws.
This situation is not rare in China. Most Chinese government officers
convicted of corruption are found in immoral sexual relationships with
others simultaneously. Corruption and sex are inseparable. This gap of
non-property interest is also identified in the Implement Review of the
United Nations Convention against Corruption. From an economic
perspective, bribery is regarded as a transaction: the briber is the supplier
side, and the bribery recipient is the demand side. If we only punish one
side and cannot prevent another side, illegal transactions are difficult to
prevent.
As we have discussed before, China has experienced dynamic process
in defining the scope of bribery. The below chart clarifies what
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constitutes bribery in the context of China laws:
Types

Bribery or Not

Source of Law

Money

Yes

Article 389 of
Criminal Code (1997)

Property (E.g., stock)

Yes

Article 389 of
Criminal Code (1997)

Money
Property

Accountable

Yes

Interest

Judicial Interpretation
of

the

Supreme

(E.g., free travel and a

People’s Court and the

waiver of a debt)

Supreme
Court

People’s
and

Supreme

the

People’s

Procuratorate (2016)
Non-Property Interest

No

(E.g., Sex Bribery)

If the bribery receiver
is working for the
government

and

related governmental
organizations
especially he or she
has

joined

Chinese

in

the

Communist

Party, he or she will
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be punished by the
internal

discipline

rules. However, the
non-property interest
briber, at lease, will
not

be

criminally

liable.

Ⅱ. Foreign Countries and International Organizations’ Legal
Practice regarding the Definition of Bribery
1. United States
Under the FCPA, a bribe is defined as “anything of value.” Unlike
China, the FCPA does not distinguish a property interest or a
non-property interest. Anything which is valuable could be used as a
bribe even if the value is just an internship opportunity. 29
2. United Kingdom
Under Section 1 of the UK Bribery Act 2010, a bribe is described as
“a financial or other advantage.” Accordingly, in the United Kingdom,
you can bribe a person with money or by offering other advantages,
including non-property interest.

29
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3. UNCAC
Unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, the UNCAC
adopted a different phrase, “undue advantage,” to describe “bribery”.
Under Article 15 of the UNCAC, it is illegal to give or offer an undue
advantage to an official to compel the official act or refrain from acting
in the excise of his or her official duties. On the other side, UNCAC
does not distinguish property interest and non-property interest, either.

Ⅲ. A Comparative Perspective between China and Other Countries
or International Organizations Regarding the Definition of Bribery.
1. Vertical Comparison
From 1997 to 2016, China has adopted a dynamic and developing
attitude in identifying bribery. It is a development for China’s anti-bribery
law to expand the scope of bribery from money and property to property
interest.
2. Horizontal Comparison
However, comparing with the FCPA, the Anti-Bribery Act 2010, and
the UNCAC, China law has an obvious gap: China law does not cover the
non-property interest into the scope of China’s anti-bribery laws. To
regulate the non-property interest is not only a requirement by UNCAC,
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but also is based on practical need.30
First, without the non-property interest, this gap results in sexual
bribery being unregulated by China’s current laws. Suppose the
prosecutor prosecutes a businesswoman who received a contract from the
public official at the expense of having a sexual relationship with him.
Under China’s current laws, the public official will be accused of abusing
his power. However, the it is hard to prove that the businesswoman is
guilty.
Second, if Chinese law does not include the non-property interest in
the scope of bribery, there leaves some grey areas. If a person receives a
payment-free internship from JPMorgan, it is hard to determine that a
payment-free internship is a property interest. 31 The defendants could
argue that they do not get any direct benefits like money, property, or
property interest from the internship except the experience. It is difficult
to evaluate the payment-free internship in terms of money. The prosecutor
may argue that the internship experience in JPMorgan will be helpful for
them to find a better job in the future. But the argument is uncertain.
Maybe the experience is helpful but maybe not. In all fairness, how a
court interprets a payment-free internship opportunity is a legal
uncertainty.

30
31

Article 15 of UNCAC
UNITED STATES V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. (S.D.N.Y.)
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Part 4: Punishment and Remedy
Ⅰ. Introduction
Under Article 12 of UNCAC, member nations of UNCAC can use
civil, administrative, or criminal penalties for failure to comply with such
measures. China’s current legal regulations on bribery can be divided into
three types: criminal sanctions, administrative regulations, and private
enforcement (civil remedies), which constitute a system in regulating
bribery.

Ⅱ. Criminal Law Punishment
Under China’s Criminal Law, the criminal law punishments imposed
on bribers include criminal fines, criminal detention, fixed-term
imprisonment, life imprisonment, and confiscation of property.
Generally, the criminal punishment for bribing a China’s state
functionary is harsher than that in a commercial bribery. That is because
bribing a China’s state functionary not only distorts the market
competition, but also erodes the loyalty of the people to the government.

29 / 44

Ⅲ. Administrative Law Punishment
1. Introduction
Before joining the UNCAC, China adopted administrative penalties
in regulating bribery.
In 1993, China has issued the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (1993
version). Under article 8 of 1993 version, it is illegal to bribe your trading
object party. In 2017, China amended the anti-unfair competition law
(2017 version). The anti-unfair competition law is designed to regulate
bribery in commercial transactions.

2. Developments of 2017 Version
1) More Detailed Definition of Commercial Bribery
The 2017 version inherits the anti-commercial-bribery clause of 1993
and expand it more comprehensive. In detail, the 2017 version divided
commercial bribery into three types:
 Bribing the opposite party of the transaction;
 Bribing the party retained by the opposite party of the transaction
(like the lawyer retained by the opposite party); and
 Bribing the person/unit having power to influence the transaction
The more detailed definition of commercial bribery is a significant
development because in the 1993 version, there is a big gap: the
legislature ignored that the bribery provider can bypass the regulation by
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bribing the party retained by the opposite party of the transaction to
achieve their purpose. The revised law has filled the gap by providing a
more detailed definition of commercial bribery.

2) Harsher Administrative Punishment on Commercial Bribery
There is a 24-year distance between 1993 version and 2017 version.
China has experienced a fabulous economic boom in the past 24 years.
Both individuals and business entities have become richer and richer.
According to IMF’s survey, China’s per capita GDP of 2017 is predicted
to be about $6000; in 1993, it was only $377.
In the1993 version, the administrative fine on commercial bribery
ranges from RMB 10,000 (about $1500) to RMB 200,000 (about
$30,000). This low fine makes it hard to deter and punish bribery
violators in China. Accordingly, the 2017 version makes the
administrative punishments harsher. First, it increases the maximum of
the administrative fine to RMB 3 million (about $500,000) and it added a
new punishment, business license revocation, which is a very strict
punishment that excludes the violating business entity from the market. 32

3. Boundary between Administrative Violation of Bribery and
Criminal Violation of Bribery

32

Article 19 of China Anti-Unfair Competition Law (2017 Version).
31 / 44

Although both administrative violations and criminal violations are
illegal, the penalties are significantly different. In the former, the violator
may be punished by an administrative fine and or business license
revocation; in the later, the violator may be punished by criminal fine and
imprisonment.
Thus, it is important to know the boundary between the administrative
violation and the criminal violation. Under China’s current criminal code,
the boundary is the bribery amount. In a natural person bribery providing
scenario, if the worth of the bribe is more than RMB 10,000 (about
$1500), the briber could be prosecuted by China’s prosecutors. In a
unit-bribe providing scenario, if the worth of the bribe is more than RMB
200,000 (about $30,000), the bribe provider could be prosecuted by
China’s prosecutors. This amount is calculated by the total amount of
bribes one briber provides rather a single instance of bribery. Accordingly,
for example, a briber bribed RMB 2,000 to ten of China’s government
officers, the briber is very likely to be charged of criminal bribery
violation.
This is a very low threshold, which resulted in many international
corporations being found to have committed criminal violations of
providing bribes in China. For example, the GlaxoSmithKline, one of the
largest drug companies, violated China’s anti-bribery laws, and four
senior executives of GlaxoSmithKline were sentenced guilty for
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providing bribes to China’s related governmental officials and hospital
executives. In this case, some doctors in the hospitals received red
package bribes with less than RMB 10,000. But all of them are calculated
into the amount of the bribe provided by GlaxoSmithKline.
Ⅳ. Private Enforcement (Civil Remedy)
1. Introduction
Entitling private parties, including natural people and legal people, to
standing in order to file a civil suit is a requirement of UNCAC. 33 This
rule has been adopted by many countries. For example, in California, a
private victim is entitled to recover his or her damages due to the
bribery. 34 China also established its private enforcement system in
anti-bribery laws. Under the 1993 version of anti-unfair competition law,
a bribery victim has a standing to bring a civil lawsuit and ask for
monetary damages and the damages could be the victim’s actual damages.
If the actual damages are difficult to calculate, the victim can ask the
court to use benefits the bribery provider received from the bribery as a
substitute of the actual damages. Once the defendant is held liable, he or
she must be responsible for all of the plaintiff’s reasonable costs of
discovery and reasonable attorney fees.
In private enforcement, China adopts the torts law suit system: if a
33
34

Article 12 of UNCAC
Section 3281 of California Civil Code
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merchant could show it lost a customer to a bribe-payer, it could sue the
briber for tortuous interference; and the merchant also can sue the
bribe-taking employee for breach of fiduciary duty.

2. Developments
China has revised its anti-unfair competition law and issued its new
version of anti-unfair competition law (2017 version). The biggest
development of 2017 version in private enforcement is that 2017 version
has established a statutory damage clause: under Article 17 of the 2017
version, if the court finds that the actual damages or the defendant’s
profits are hard to calculate, the court has discretion to grant a
no-more-than RMB 3000,000 (about $500,000) to the plaintiff.
The new statutory damages clause is a big achievement because in
practice, sometimes the plaintiff cannot prove either actual damage or the
defendant’s profits. Generally, even though the plaintiff can spend much
money in employing an expert as an expert witness to show the actual
damages or the defendant’s profits, it is hard to prove them in some
complex transactions. Thus, the statutory changes could reduce the
workload of the plaintiff and better compensate the plaintiff as well. In
addition, establishing statutory damages has been adopted by many
countries. For example, the California Unfair Competition Law has
adopted a statutory-damage rule to compensate consumers who were
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adversely affected by unfair business acts, including bribery violations.35

Part 5: Defense: Specific Intent Defense
Ⅰ. Introduction
The question is when a benefit provider provides benefits to a
recipient, can he or she bring the defense that he or she did not have an
intent to pursue an illegal interest? Regarding the question, the scholars in
China are divided into two groups: general intent theory and specific
intent theory.
Ⅱ. Comparison: General Intent Theory and Specific Intent Theory
1. General Intent Theory

1) Definition
Under this theory, a bribery violation just needs the briber to be
willing to provide the bribery or to provide the bribery knowingly.
2) Advantages and Disadvantages of General Intent Theory
Regarding the general intent theory, the advantages are: it decreases
the workload of the investigator and the burden of proof of the prosecutor,
and it could have a stronger deterring effects to the public. However, it
has obvious disadvantages: (1) the general intent theory may confuse the
35

Section 1780 of California Civil Code
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distinction between a legal gift and an illegal bribe, and (2) the general
intent theory may punish an innocent person who is forced to provide a
bribe without a purpose to purse an illegitimate interest, or who is willing
to provide a bribe with an intent to purse a legal interest.

2. Specific Intent Theory
1) Definition
Under this theory, a general intent alone is not enough to constitute a
bribery violation. A briber must have a specific intent to purse an
illegitimate benefit.
2) Advantages and Disadvantages of Specific Intent Theory
The specific intent theory requires the court to distinguish between a
legal gift and an illegal bribe, and protect the innocent bribery providers.
However, the specific intent theory increases the workload of both
investigators and prosecutors. However, a law which may deprive other
people’s liberty, property, or life must be modest; a law should not
wrongfully include any innocent people.
Ⅲ. Foreign Law Practice
Unlike China’s Criminal Law, the FCPA does not use the phrase
“illegitimate gains” to describe bribery. Conversely, the FCPA uses the
phrase “corruptly” to describe bribery. To violate the FCPA, an offer,
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promise, or authorization of a payment, or a government official must be
made corruptly. 36 Under the United States Congress notes, the word
“corruptly” means an intent or desire to wrongfully influence the
recipient. The word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the
offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient
to misuse his official position. For example, to wrongfully direct business
to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential legislation or regulations,
or to induce a foreign official to perform or fail to perform an official
function.37
Under American law, a general intent (willingness to provide
payment knowingly) is not enough to trigger the FCPA or the domestic
bribery statute. The provider must have a specific intent to influence the
recipient.
Ⅳ. Specific Intent Defense in China
In China, the majority trend in this question is regarding the
specific intent theory. Under Article 389, “An act of giving state
functionaries articles of property in order to seek illegitimate gain shall be
considered a crime of offering bribes.”38
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The FCPA does not explicitly define “corruptly”, but in drafting the statute Congress adopted the meaning
ascribed to the same term in the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201.
37
The House Report states in full: The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or purpose such as that required
under 18 U.S.C. 201 (b) which prohibits domestic bribery. As in 18 U.S.C. 201(b) which prohibits domestic bribery.
As in 18 U.S.C. 201(b), the word “corruptly” indicates an intent or desire wrongfully to influence the recipient. It
does not require that the act [be] fully consummated or succeed in producing the desired outcome.
38
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm
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Here, a new question arises based on the specific intent theory:
what is an illegitimate gain and what is a legitimate gain? In practice, the
argument that the briber is pursing legal interests is the most common
argument. To deal with this problem, China’s Supreme People's Court and
Supreme People's Procuratorate enacted a joint judicial interpretation in
2012. 39 Under Article 12 of this judicial interpretation, the concept of
pursuing illegal interest is defined as: “(1) to pursue interests violating
laws, administrative regulations, or administrative rules, or to ask the
state

functionary

to

violate

laws,

administrative

regulations,

administrative rules, public policies, or industry standards for facilitating
the bribery provider obtaining an illegal interest; or (2) to pursue
competition advantages by violating the equality principle and the equity
principle.
Accordingly, we can divide interests into three types: (1) legal
interest, the interest you can get it without the bribe; (2) illegal interest:
the interest you may obtain without the interest; and (3) the interest you
cannot obtain without the bribery.
An example of a legal interest is if a person is disabled and he is
eligible to receive a disability subsidy under Chinese law. If Chinese
government officials demand him to provide a bribe for getting the
disability subsidiary, he is not guilty because the subsidiary is an illegal

39
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interest. An example of an illegal interest is how people wanting to apply
for a vehicle license plate must attend the plate lottery and if the
applicants have satisfied all the requirements the interest of a vehicle
plate is likely to be obtained by the applicants. But if an applicant
provides a bribe to the plate lottery officer for obtaining the plate, he or
she will violate anti-bribery laws.
The below chart illustrates the relationship between different types
of interests and bribery under the context of China’s anti-bribery law:
Types of Interest

Illegal or Legal

You cannot obtain the interest Illegitimate
without the bribery
You

may obtain

the

interest Illegitimate

without the bribery
You can obtain the interest without Legitimate
the briery
Accordingly, one can define the scope of a legal interest under the
context of anti-bribery laws of China as the interest you can obtain
without the bribery. And the scope of an illegal interest is that (1) you
cannot obtain the interest without the bribery; or (2) you may obtain the
interest with the bribery. Accordingly, if a person provides bribery with
an intent to pursue a legitimate interest, he or she will not violate China’s
anti-bribery laws.
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Part 6: Drawbacks and Proposals
Ⅰ. Redefine the Concept of Bribery
As discussed previously, the definition of the bribe in China’s
current law context does not contain the non-property interest. China has
been criticized by the UNCAC Implement Review Group because of this
gap, which could facilitate the bribe because of the non-property interest.
Regulating the non-property interest bribery is not only a
requirement of the UNCAC, but also has been adopted by many countries.
For example, FCPA does not distinguish property interest or non-property
interest in the definition of bribery; rather, under the FCPA, giving
anything of value to any foreign official may constitute bribery. Likewise,
Article 15 of UNCAC defines bribery as any undue advantage. In practice,
the briber has used non-property interest in bribing. For example, in
JPMorgan, JPMorgan agreed to pay $264.4 million to the Department of
Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Federal Reserve to
resolve FCPA offenses for awarding prestigious jobs to relatives and
friends of Chinese government officials in order to be awarded banking
contracts. 40 In this case, it is hard to say that the prestigious jobs awards
are property interests or could be calculated by money. However, it also
constitutes bribery under American law.
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Accordingly, China should expand its definition of bribery and
incorporate the non-property interest into its definition. In detail,
regarding the definition of bribery, China should just use the term “undue
advantage” or “anything of value” to describe what is bribery.

Ⅱ. Compulsory Internal Control Mechanism
1. Foreign Country Experience in Internal Control Mechanism
If we compare the corruption to a pest on the apple, we can regard
an internal control mechanism as a bottle of insecticide. Good insecticide
could prevent the pest assaulting your fruits.
The accounting provision is one of the two main clauses in FCPA. It
requires issuers to create and enforce an effective internal control system
reducing and managing the corruption risks. In detail, it requires the
issuers to make and keep books, records, and accounts accurately and
fairly reflecting the transactions and dispositions of the issuer’s assets.
Additionally, it also requires that the issuers create and maintain a good
system of internal accounting. This provision pushes issuers in America
to do more in self-management of risk of corruption. Likewise, a good
accounting system could facilitate SEC and DOJ’s investigation against
potential corruption violations. For China, a good internal accounting
program is not difficult to implement. Many China’s big companies have
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employed top accounting firms to keep books, records, and accounts
accurately and fairly reflecting the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer. The problem here is that China lacks a compulsory
internal control provision that would require big companies, like issuers
and state-owned or controlled companies, to establish a good internal
control system.

2. Having Good Internal Control Program beyond Legal
Requirement
Many big companies have established good internal control
programs to reduce their internal corruption risks. The following reasons
encourage the companies to establish higher-standard internal control
systems:
First, an effective internal control program can eliminate the risks of
embezzlement, self-dealing, bribery, etc.
Second, a good internal control program may help the company to
mitigate and defended its legal liability. For example, under the FCPA,
individuals are only subject to the FCPA’s criminal penalties for
violations of the accounting provisions if they acted “willfully.”
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The

term “willfully” means the company is voluntarily and intentionally
failing to establish or implement the internal control program. 42 A
41
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15 U.S. Code § 78ff
See Black Law Dictionary, Forth Pocket Edition (2011)
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company could argue that it has tried its best efforts to establish and
implement its internal control program and the failure is not its fault. In
this scenario, the company is not willfully breaching the internal control
provision. Thus, the FCPA may not impose criminal liability on the
company. Accordingly, companies have the incentive to establish good
internal control programs to mitigate or eliminate its potential liability.

3. China’s Current Internal Control Practice
Some big companies in China have established compliance system
designed to reduce the risk of corruption. However, China has not
established a rule to require all the insurers and other big companies in
China to establish internal control mechanisms. According, China’s
current regulations neglect corruption regulation.

4. Who should be Covered by the Internal Control Mechanism?
A. Issuers of Securities Registered in China’s Security Stock
Exchanges
Like FCPA, China’s future accounting provision should require the
listed companies to establish and enforce a good internal control
mechanism. Because these companies are big companies and their stocks
can be purchased by the public. Once corruption occurs, the corruption
will not only erode the honesty and loyalty of the government and the
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competition of the market, but also could affect huge middle and small
sized stockholders’ interest. Thus, the internal control’s main target must
be the issuers of securities.

B. State-Owned/Controlled Enterprises
Unlike the United States, China is a socialist country, which has
lots of state-owned/controlled business enterprises. And compared with
private companies, theses state-owned or controlled business enterprises
are more likely to have corruption scandals. Thus, China should establish
a compulsory internal control rule in the future covering state-owned or
controlled business enterprises. It not only because the state-owned or
controlled enterprise have high incidence of corruptions but also because
the wealth managed by the state-owned/controlled enterprises belongs to
all citizens of China.
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